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WHERE NAVE ALL THE
NETWORKS GONE?
The automated teller machine (ATM) has
become an increasinglymore important
part of the average modern consumer’s
financial life and for this reason presents
an ever-more pressing set of difficult
antitrust questions for networks, financial
institutions and government decision-
makers. Thirty-two years ago, the Supreme
Court emphasized in its landmark
Philadelphia National Bank decision that
convenience and location were key to
competition in the retail banking sector
and ruled that “the fact that banking is a
highly regulated industry critical to the
Nation’s welfare makes the play of compe-
tition not less important, but more so.”
Today ATMs are the key to consumer
conveniencein banking, and yet it is not
at all clear that the Supreme Court’s
Philadelphia National Bank message about
the importance of competition has gotten
through to the policymakers and courts
making decisions about ATM networks.
In the last decade, large and successful
ArM networks have been created, and
such names as MAC, NYCE, STAR and
HONOR have become familiar landmarks
in different parts of the country Meanwhile,
the number of ATM network alternatives
available in any particular region has
continued to decrease.
Why has antitrust policy been such
a random—and not particularly construe-
tive— factor as mergers have helped
createdominant ATM networks in various
regions of the country? Natural monopoly
economies? Or just honest uncertainty
and indecision? ‘[he Board of Governors
has told us that “the largest regional
networks now account for 80 percent of all
regional ATM network transactions in the
United States” and used this as a reason for
approving another network merger in the
Electronic Payments Services, Inc/National
City ease.1
Meanwhile, Department ofJustice
(DOJ)officials have influenced the course
ofevents over the years with what they
have said, done or—more often—not
done. They have thus left the field largely
to private plaintiffs, the private attorneys
general who are necessarily more interested
in winning battles than in establishing
policies and precedents. It is hard to dig
out of the resultant patchwork of DOJ
press releases and Business ReviewLetters,
private complaints and a few consent
jtndgments any coherent vision of the
modern ATM network as a competitor
or of the markets in which networks
operate. Probably the most serious effort
at illumination was entirely private:
Former U.S. Assistant Attorney General
Thomas E. Kauper’s long opinion, as
a private arbitrator in the 1988 First
Texas/Pulse arbitration.1
DQJ has not been a factor in the
network merger area. Its most instructive
enforcement effort—its 1994 complaint,
consent decree and competitive impact
statement in United States v Electronic
Payments Services, Inc—dealt ~vith the
consequences (rather than the creation)
of monopoly power. It was DOJ’s first
antitrust enforcement action in the
electronic funds transfer (EFT) sector in
17 years. Significantly DOJ’s complaint
asserts that branded ATM network access is
a relevant market and recognizes that ATM
networks may enjoy substantial market
power on a regional basis. (The DCJJ
I United States v. Philadelphia
Nailonal Bank in 374 United
States Reports (U.S.) 321
(United States Supreme Court,
1963).
Banc One Corporation, et of,
March 6,1995, p.17 (the
EPS/Notional City opinion).
See also Banc One Carp.,
Federal Reserve Bulletin,
vol.81(1995), pp.491-2.
I have a client who is very
interested in this proceeding.
The views expressed here,
however, are my awn.
1 First Texas Assa./Financiol
Interchange in 55 Antitrust &
Trade Regulation Report 340
(1988). Professor Kauper
wrote that opinion becouse the
parties had agreed that he
would do so as part of their
arbitration agreement. (I was
lead counsel for Pulse in that
unique proceeding.)
-, UnitedStates v. Electronic
Payments Services, Inc,
Na. 94-208 [U.S. District Court
for the District of Delaware
Apr. 21,1994159 Federal
Register (Fed. Reg.) 24711
(May 12, 1994).
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See EPS/Notm’onol City opinion,
p.17.
‘See FPS/Nohbnol City opinion,
p.14.
consent decree enjoins one MAC network
practice—concerning ATM driving—but
leaves other restraints in place.)
By chance, the Federal Reserve
System’s most illuminating effort also
involves the same ATM network—EPS or
MAC—but the Board’s extensive effort
also turned out to be rather timid on
both structural and conduct issues. On
March 1, 1995, the Board of Governors
announced that it was allowing a major
expansion of this already dominant Penn-
sylvania network by allowing it to include
National City Bank of Ohio in the owner-
ship group. In a 28-page statement
released five days later, the Board rejected
the objection of a competing ATM network
to “undue concentration of resources”
with a statement that “the Boardbelieves
that, as a result of economic and market
conditions, regions are likely to have one
dominant ATM network.” At the same
time, as Vice Chairman Alan Blinder’s
dissent made clear, the Board declined
to follow up on the perceptive sets of ques-
tions concerning allegedly anticompetitive
network rules that the Board staffhad pre-
sented during its investigation. The Board
seemed to take comfort from DOTs prior
inaction on some subjects in its consent
decree proceeding.~
As observers and students, we can all
be grateful to the MAC network for having
been such a patron of antitrust learning in
the ATM field. As critics and consumers,
we may c9me away with some doubts
about how well government agencies have
done in meeting the challenge.
In sum, those sporadic government
activities—plus a few private cases
challenging leading ATM networks’ pricing
practices and operating rules—cannot he
said to have added up to the kind of com-
prehensible body of law that Philadelphia
National Bank spawned in the bank merger
area. It simply has proved difficult for the
Fed, DOJ and the courts to come to grips
with the market realities and the competi-
tive effects of these new and important
financial enterprises—branded ATM
networks. Like the federal budget deficit,
this accumulated learning deFicit may pose
larger burdens on the next generation
of consumers and regulators: the real
competitive issues are not likely to go
away even ifwe end up with largely an





Creation of any new network requires
a great deal of cooperation among the
proposed members. An ATM network is
necessarily the reciprocal commitment by
participants to issue cards, deploy machines,
honor each others’ cards at their machines
andsettle the resulting transactions.
A newnetwork needs access to facilities
forswitching transactions among members,
rules governing the terms and conditions
on which members will honor each others’
transactions and a recognizable trademark
that will tell consumers where network
services are available. The switching
facilities may be (and often are) provided
by a third-party processor under contract,
whereas the rules and trademark may
be created with extensive help from expe-
rienced professional advisors. Even so,
somebody—presumably the investors
and users—must work through a whole
series of difficult business decisions to
turn the network idea into an effective
operational network.
The main reason for a depository insti-
tution to create or participate in such a
network is competitive advantage—or at
least the fear of being left behind in the
changing payments marketplace. Different
potential participants may have quite
different visions of what they want a
network to do for them. An aggressive
growing bank may want a quite differenti-
ated network offering its customers
something not available from its sleepy
competitors across the street or in the
next town. Meanwhile, the comnpetitor
may want the opposite: a teniversal or
least-common denominator network that
guarantees the proverbial level playing
field and ensures that nobody is left
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behind in the new world of ATM-based
banking convenience.1 Thus there is a
great deal of room for business and
competitive disputes over what the
network should have its members do,
what it should do, and what it was going
to charge metnbers for doing it.
..AN.TITRUST RE.AI.ITJES
A shared ATM network requires
collective action involving competitors.
This can be in the form of: (1) a joint ven-
ture of participating institutions or (2) a
series of contracts between a single system
operator and the other participants in its
network. Either way the network
arrangements fall within the “contract,
combination, or conspiracy ... in
restraint of trade” rubric of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.8 Therefore, disputes
among members of a network over
business questions that in any way relate
to competition can he framed as antitrust
cases. Because the Clayton Act automati-
cally awards treble damages, disputes are
very likely to end up as antitrust cases,
especially when the plaintiff’s hand is
strengthened by being able to show that
the defendant is a regionally dominant
network or controls such a network.’
Effective network planning and antitrust
counseling becomes ever more essential
as regional ATM markets become
more monopolistic.
The treatment of jointventures has
been one of the most confusing areas of
antitrustjurisprudence in the United
States, as well as in many foreign countries.
Agreements among direct horizontal com-
petitors have been treated severely under
antitrust law and, where they involved
pricing restraints or customer allocations,
could be labeled cartels. Meanwhile, full
integration by merger has generally been
analyzed under market structure standards
in which results depended primarily
on the nature of the market and the
parties’ share of it. Joint ventteres have
historically—hut unevenly—been
subjected to cartel rules.” The modern
trend, however, has been to look at joint
ventures that created something new
under merger rules or under the fact-based
rule of reason theory” Market power
(rather than form) is critical to such
an inquiry
This conclusion is not so confusing as
it might seem at first blush. Today it is
possible to say both that: (1) under modem
antitrust rules, it is likely that creation of a
joint venture and corresponding rules will
be looked at in a context that includes
evaluation of market power and relevant
market, and (2) we have very little idea
precisely what definition of a relevant
marketwill be used to evaluate the
competitive effect of an ATM network
merger or of a rule imposed by a major
ATM network. A narrow market
definition, of course, may produce high
market shares (and even an inference
of monopoly power), whereas a broad





and the courts have not developed any
consistent way of defining mnarkets for
ATM networks, or indeed for networks
generally They have not really figured out
how to factor the brand element into the
analysis of the relevant market for ATM
networks. The presence of a brand would
seem to make an ATM networkvery different
from a joint venture pipeline or electric
powerpool (hut not necessarily from a
longdistance telephone network or a
credit card network). Both DQJ and the
Fed have finally seemed to recognize
this difference.
Recognizing the differences between
brand and nonhrand markets is not just a
matter of intellectual curiosity Determina-
tion of the relevant market is often critical
in antitrust litigation. TI’he plaintifftries to
define the market as narrowly as possible to
strengthen the claim that the defendant has
market power or the ability to increase
prices above the competitive level. The
defendant argues that the market is almost
‘In mare than 20 states, smaller
banks hove successfully led
populist political campaigns to
mandate universality solutions
by passing compulsory sharing
legislation thot requires each
bank to share its ATM facilities
with every other bank on
equal, or nondiscriminatory
terms. See Baker and Brondel
(1995)1(25.03141 [a).
815 United States Code (U.S.C.)
§ I.
‘15 U.S.C. § 15.
“See, for example, United
States v. Topro Assocs.,
405 U.S. 596 (1972); United
States v Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S.
350 (1967) (territariol and
price restraints); United States
Columbia Pictures Indus.,
507 Federal Supplement (F.
Supp.) 412, 430 [U.S. District
Court far the Southern District
of New York (S.D.N.Y.) 1980,
affirmed in a memorandum
decision (aff’d mem.,) 659
Federol Reporter 21 Series
(F.2d) 1063 U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit
(2d Cir.) 19811.
‘‘See generally, Chapter 21
‘Special Antitrust Prohlems of
Joint Ventures’ in Baker and
Brandel (1988), discussing
especially Broadcast Music, Inc.
CBS, 441 U.S. 79(1979)
and NCAA v. Boardof Regents,
468 U.S. 85(1984).





pravision to unaffiliated finan-
cial institutions of Iota process~
ing services, particularly the
operation of an ATM network
exchange), Interstate Financial
Corp. (1983) (same).
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“See,for example, Citicorp
(1986) (provision of AIM see
vices), Sovron Financial Corp.
(1986) (same), Bardays Bank
PLC (1985) (competition in
the provision of ATM or POS
services).
682 F. Supp. 269 (U.S. District
Court for the District of New
Jersey (D.NJ.), aff’d men.,
853 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1988).
Id. at 279 (emphasis in
original).
“59 Fed. Rag. 24713 (May 12,
1994). Similarly, in the PULSE
arbitration, Professor Kauper
rejected proposed markets of
oIlpoymentsystems and all
means ofobtaining cask ond
instead identified a narrow
retail market of ATM services
an the grounds ‘that there is a
significant group of ATM users
who value the characteristicsof
ATMs and for whom other
means of obtaining cash are
not reasonable substitutes.’
He thus concluded that “AlMs
ore themselves a relevant, if
fragile, market for antitrust pur-
poses.’ 55 Trade keg. Rep.
(BNA) Na. 1380, at 356.
“59 Fed. keg. 24712 (May 12,
1994). In PULSE, Professor
Kouper identified a wholesale
marketof network sv.’itclring,
and concluded that PULSF had
marketpower because ‘exist’
ing subnetworks, regional net’
works and national networks
do not presently provide a rea-
sonable substitute far the
[switching) service PULSE pro-
vides to its members.” Id. at
355. Other regional networks
were found no be only potential
alternatives for lexas ATM own-
ers and substantial harriers
(including tIre national net-
works’ nntiduality mernhership
rules, the preference by banks
for local networks and the fact
that PULSE was very efficient
and well established) were said
boundless. The relevant market typically is
determined on the basis of a factual
inquiry into the practical alternatives avail-
able to customers—which in the ATM
network business can mean either institu-
tions or their depositors.
The decisions on relevant ATM network
markets have been all over the board. In
its early orders approving hank holding
companies’ acquisitions of voting stock in
shared EFT networks, the Federal Reserve
Board typically defined the relevant market
as the provision of data processing services to
tcnaffiliatedfinancial institutions.” By the
xnid-1980s, however, itbegan to define the
markets with reference to consumer
payment networks (but it never found a
case in which a merger would create
market power).” Similarly in The
Treasurea Inc. v Philadelphia National Bank,
the District Court adopted abroad defini-
tion of the relevant product market in
rejecting a private challenge to the acquisi-
tion of the Mellon Cashstream network by
the owner and operator of the then propri-
etary MAC network.” The court defined
the relevant product market as “electronic
data processing to all ATMs plus all of
those institutions which have unaffiliated
ATIVI systems and those institutions which
do not currently have ATMs but have the
capacity to install them and utilize unarket
technology to its fullest.”
Recently the market definition issue
has become tnore focused—thanks to DQJ,
the Fed and the MAC network. In its El’S
complaint, the Antitrust Division of the
DOJ defined two relevant markets. The
first was a market of regional branded
ATM acc:ess, based on the needs of banks
to provide their depositors “ubiquitous
access to their accounts.” It observed
the following:
While a bank can deploy its
own ATMs, the advantage to a
shared ATM network is that a hank)
depositors will be able co use ATMs
at many more locations than one
bank alone could practicably support.
The areas a hank seeks to serve
thei ugh a shared ATM network
include the areas in which its deposi-
tors live, work and sleep, and the
broader areas in which they move
regularly A bank~ability to offer its
depositors access to other banks’
ATMs, and thereby to offer its depos-
itors convenient access to their
accounts, is in most bankers’ view
necessary to attract and retain
deposits. -- .Because no other
service constitutes a reasonably close
substitutefor regional ATM network
access, regional ATM networks
constitutes a product market.
The DOJ’s second market was ATM
processing, which involved “providing the
data processing services and telecommuni-
cations facilities and services used” in
providing regional ATM access.”
The Board revisited the market defini-
tion question in its recent FPS/National
City decision:
The Board notes that ATM
networks have been recognized as
encompassing separate product
markets -- .- On the basis ofthese
considerations and all the otherfacts
of record, the Board concludes that
network access, network services,
and ATM processing constitutethe
relevant product marketsJor evaluat-
ing the competitive effects of
thisproposal.
On the question of geographic market, the
Board pointed to a Federal Reserve staff
study that “suggests that the geographic
market for network access is an area signif-
icantly larger than local banking markets.”
The Board then added that “the markets
for network services and ATM processing
are at least regional.””
Ultimately how a fact finder analyzes
the relevant product market in cases
involving bank networks depends in part
on how much weight is accorded to the
value of the network trademark. If one
looks only to the data processing function
of shared ATM networks, it may he plausible
to conclude, as the Board of Governors has
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in the past, that the data processing industxy
is unconcentraced, that entry barriers are
low, and that there are numerous alternatives
available to financial institutions that want
to do their own data processing and that a
network—even a dominant regional
network—does not have market power.
On the other hand, if the ATM network is
viewed as the purveyor of a unique branded
product marketed under the network logo,
the fact finder should probably reach
vexy different conclusions about the
product market.
There have been very few new entries
into the branded ATM network market any-
where in the country It requires a critical
mass of cards and ATMs. Participating
institutions have a lot of reasons to be con-
cerned about having to switch from one
network to another—in part because it
would involve reissuing cards, reassigning
ATMs and, perhaps more important,
reeducating customers.
Market analysis has been further com-
plicated because networks are clearly
subject to economies of both scope and
scale. Indeed, DOJ noted the economies
of ubiquity in analyzing ATM network
arrangements back in the mid-1980s—a
timewhen it was not particularly active as
an antitrust enforcer.”
Continuing uncertainty as to what
market concepts should be used to evaluate
ATM network arrangements has no doubt
caused government decisionmakers to be
cautious about taking structural antitrust
action in the ATM network area, while
causing ATM networks to be cautious
about accepting the risks ofprivate litiga-
tion. Both effects have contributed to the
regional monopolies that we have seen





Many ATM networks were started by
those who sought competitive advantage
for themselves over local competitors or
out-of-state institutions that could become
increasingly competitive from the distance
in the plastic and electronics mode.
Despite this competitive advantage impetus
in the early stages,network consolidation
has turned out to be the trend. Two
factors have led to this trend: (1) lack of
government antitrust enforcement of ATM
network mergers; and (2) dejacto network
mergers brought about by the ability of
some banks to use antitrustboycott claims
to force entry into competing networks
and thereby defeat network exclusivity
Mergers. Since the mid-1980s there has
been tremendous consolidation among
ATM networks. For a generation, DOJ and
the Board of Governors have allowed every
ATM network merger they reviewed, even
when the result was a regional monopoly”
The most striking example was the 1988
MAC-Cashstream acquisition (in which
Philadelphia National Bank acquired Mel-
lon’s branded ATM network). These two
networks together controlled virtually all
the branded ATMs in Pennsylvania, where
they competed vigorously for members
and transactions. Their merger was chal-
lenged—unsuccessfully—by a third
network, the acquisition of which (by
MAC) eliminated most competition in
southern NewJersey” The DOJ had
declined to act, and the Board was not
involved in the transaction.
In the 1990s, the Board of Governors
has continued to approve major network
mergers. An important 1994 example,
scrutinized carefully by both the Board and
DOJ, was the merger of NYCE and Yankee
24, which competedin parts of New Eng-
land and were togetherjoined by Citibank’s
ATM network. In approving the merger,
the Board noted that “a number of factors
should mitigate the loss of Yankee 24. --
as an independent competitor.”4 In partic-
ular, the Board relied on the network’s
operating rules, which permit (1) third-
party processors to participate; (2) members
to participate in other networks; (3) card
issuers to determine routing; and (4) insti-
tutions to participate on a nondiscriminatory
basis. Ofparticular importance may be the
card issuer routing rule, which might
to impede competition from the
national networks, PLUS and
CIRRUS. Id. at 353-4.
EPS/Nolionol City opinion, p. 7
(footnotes omitted.)
Id. at 8-9.
“ Id. at 9.
“Former U.S. Assistant Attorney
General Charles Rule suggested
in 1985 that, in analyzing ATM
network consolidation, the
antitrust division focused more
on the economies of ubiquity
and the resulting consumer
benefits achievable by wide-
spread shaing of ATMs, and he
indicated that the division
would not challenge shored
ATM networks based an size
alone. See (holes F, Rule,
‘Antitrust Analysis of Joint
Ventures in the Banking
Industry — Evaluating Shored
AIMs,’ Remarks Before the
Federal Bar Association and
American Association (May 23,
1985), reprinted in Baker ond
Brondel (21. ed. 1988),
at A’ 139.
Balto, ‘Payments Systems
and Antitrust: Con the
Opportunities for Network
Competition be Recognized?”
speech before the D.C. Bar
Association, January 25, 1995.
“The Treasurer, Inc
Philadelphia Naianol Bank,
682 F. Supp. 269 (U.S. Distict
Court far the District of New
Jersey 1988), off’d mem.,
853 F.2d 921 (3d Or. 1988).
the court dismissed the suit on
the grounds that the plaintiff
had suffered no antitrust injury
as required under sections 4
and 16 of the Clayton Act and
hence locked standing to sue.
Decision of Oct. 3, 1994, at 8.
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“EPS/Natianal City opinion, at
17 (footnotes omitted).
“See Baxter, Caatner and Scott
(1977).
permit banks to choose lower cost networks
ifthe merged network attempted to raise
prices.
Then, in the even more recent
EPS!National City order, the Board seems
to abandon regional network competition
as an important factor, even where the
network rules were open to more serious
competitive questions. In this decision,
the Board said:
It has been recognized that
MAC has a significant position in
ATM network access services in
certain states in the Mideast region.
However the significant position of a
regional ATM network is not, standing
alone, contraly to thepublic interest.
Network externalities, such as the
economies ofubiquity, tend topro-
mote consolidation of regionalATM
networks. As a result, in various
geographic areas, like the Mideast
region, dominant ATM networks
have been emerging throughout the
EFT industry. One recentstudy
indicates that the ten largest regional
networks now account for80 percent
of all regional ATM network transac-
tions in the United States. In this
light, the Board believes that, as a
resultof economic and market struc-
ture conditions, regions are likely to
have one dominantATM network.”
Inaction by the DOJ and the regulators
appears to have been driven by two factors:
(I) recurring doubts overwhether branded
network service is. in fact, a relevant
market; and (2) uncertainty about the
economics of ubiquity—which loosely
translated means, the more coverage the
better. Under this concept, a merger
between ATM systems seemed procompeti-
tive because it increased the number of
cardholders and ATMs in a network,
improving accessibility for consumers.
They do so at the price of eliminating
competition for institutions that issue
cards and deployATMs and creating a risk
of monopoly pricing and market cornering.
In many regions, all this merger activity
leaves only the national ATM networks
(PLUS and CIRRUS) as possible challengers
to regionally dominant networks. Although
the national networks offer a degree
of coverage comparable to a dominant
regional network, they depend for coverage
on the same regional leaders which control
the regional network and hence may be
unlikely to be seen as vigorous competitive
alternatives. The competitive impact state-
ment in the EPS/National City case noted
that national ATM networks are “by design
networks of the last resort.”
Do facto Mergers Resulting From
Boycott Claims
Threats of private litigation based on
“boycott” theories have also tended to
reduce the differentiation of ATM networks.
A member of one network may attempt to
join a competing network, perhaps to gain
some sort of competitive advantage. Ifit
and others are admitted, the result may
be a defacto merger between the two
networks and a concomitant loss of inter-
system competition. Because the antitrust
standards have never been very clear and
private litigation possess the threat of
treble damages, these cases usually end up
with the admission of the complaining
nonmember—followed by similarly
situated competitors.
This reality is well illustrated by what
happened in Texas in 1982—when DOJ
deferred action based on uncertainty At
the time, therewere two separate, very
competitive ATM networks in Texas:
PULSE and MPACT. PULSE was a
nonprofit joint venture andMPACT was a
shared propriety network owned by
Mercantile Texas Corporation. A large
thrift institution, First Texas Savings and
Loan Association, was an MPACT member
and wanted tojoin PULSE, which had an
exclusive membership rule. PULSE resisted
this, and counsel for the parties eventually
agreed that the issues would be resolved
through the DOJ business review
procedure, rather than litigation. PULSE
asked whether the division would take
enforcement action if it: (I) admitted as a
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. SeIZES
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member First Texas; (2) generally admitted
members of competing networks; or (3)
barred its members from participating in a
compecing network such as MPACr. U.S.
Assistant Attorney General WilliamF Baxter,
a leading author in the field, answered only
the first question.” He said that the incre-
mental consumer convenience that would
result from admitting the savings and loan
association appeared to outweigh the
restraint on rivalry that unight occur
between the two competing networks.”
The other two questions were not
answered because DOl did not consider
them ripe for review Thereafter, PULSE
admitted virtually all the depository insti-
tutions in Texas, and DQJ did not do
anything about it. Thus PULSE became
the universal network in Texas, and
MPACT became a substantial competitive
participant in it.
Similarly in i986, BayBanks, at the
timeoperator ofone of the largest propri-
etary ATM networks in the United States,
sued Yankee 24, a new joint venture
ATM network, when it was denied access
to Yankee 24.” At the time, competition
between the established BayBanks and
the nascent shared network was very
active. Yankee 24 offered an aggressive
pricing structure to attract banks, and
both networks offered low fees to
consumers to attract accounts. The
parties settled; BayBanks was admitted,
and Yankee 24 eliminated its incentive
pricing structure.”
The recent, high-visibility Dean Witter
IVisa decision by the 10th U.S. Circuit
Court ofAppeals may provide much needed
guidance in this area.” The case involved
a boycott challenge to a Visa bylaw that
denied membership to any institution that
issues Discover cards, American Express
cards “or any other card deemed competi-
tive by the Board of Directors.” After long
pretrial sparring, the case went to trial in
fall 1992 and the plaintiff prevailed before
the jury In September 1994, the appellate
court reversed because it determined that
Visa lacked market power in a properly
defined market (in which Visa was treated
as separate from MasterCard) and because
the Visa rule promoted intersyscem cocnpe-
tition in card issuance. Iffollowed, this
decision should reduce the likelihood chat
a competitor can use the threat of a boycott
claim to reduce the ability of competing
networks to differentiate themselves. This
message may he a little late in the branded
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Modern antitrust analysis ofjoint
ventures since Broadcast Music has tended
to turn very heavily on market power con-
siderations under the rule of reason.” In
simplest terms, this means that a small
network without market power should he
able to do chings that a big network with
market pow-er would he prohibited fi’om
doing. The message has great practical
importance as fesver and fewer ATM
networks are becoming ever more
doaninant in their regional markets.
The message was reetnphasized last
year when, after more than a generation of
silence, the antitrust division reentered the
EFT network enforcement marketwith a
suit against the largestATM network in the
United States—MAC, operated by EPS.”
Originally started by Philadelphia National
Bank (the most famous anticrcast defendant
in the financial sector), EPS had become a
joint venture of four leading Pennsylvania
and Ohio hank holding companies. It had
approximately a 90 percent market share
in Pennsylvania and a strong position in
adjacent mid-Atlantic states (as a restult, in
part, of prior mergers that DOJ had not
challenged). The DQJ complaint alleged
that EPS barred banks thatbelonged to its
network From buyingdata processingservice
from third parties and used its control over
ATM processing to prevent member
banks from connecting with competing
networks. It alleged violations under
both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
“See also letter from William
Baxter, assistant attorney gen-
erol, antitrust division, to
Donald I. Baker (Aug. 3,
1983), discussed in Baker and
Brandel (l995)~ 24.D6 [31.
“See BayBonks, Inc v. New
England Network, mc,
Na. 86-3532-K (U.S. District
court for the District of
Massachusetts) filed Dec. 9,
1986). I was one of the
defendants’ attorneys in this
proceeding.
“Similar access issues hove been
raised by nonbank banks such
as Merrill-Lynch, American
Express and Sears, seeking
access to AIM networks. these
cases were settled with the
admission of the nanbank
banks to the network. See
Household Bank, FS.B.
Cirrus System, Inc., No.
87(2353 [filed U.S. District
Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, Mar. 2, 19871;
Household Bank, PSI. v.
Money Station, Inc., No. C-2-
88-D274 [filed U.S. District
Court for the Southern District
of Ohio, Mar. 2, 19881.
In 1993, BuyPnss Corp., the
owner of thei~( AIM network.
sued the NYCE AIM network
seeking access for its processing
subsidiary. The case was
settled with an agreement that
hoth MAC nnd NYCE could act
as a third-party processor in
each other’s network. See
BuyPoss Corp. v. New York
Switch Corp., No. 93-CV-32D1
[U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
filed June 15, 19931.
‘SCFCILC Inc v. VISA U.S.A.,
36 F3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994).
“Broadcast Musk, Inc u. CBS,
441 U.S. 111979).
“United States x Electronic
Payments Services, mr., No.
94-208 ID. Del. Apr. 21,
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19941,59 Fed. Reg. 24711
(May 12, 1994).
“504 U.S. 451 (1992).
First Texas Sovings
Assn./Finanriol tntecchonge,
Inc, 55 Antitrust g trade leg.
Rep. 340 (1988) (Thornos E.
Kauper, arbitrator).
“Valley Bank ofNevoda mc Plus
Systems, mc, 749 F. Supp.
223 (U.S. District Courtfor the
District of Nevada ID. Nev.)
19891 affirmed 914 F2d
1186(9th Cir. 1990)
(Commerce Clouse lMgotion).
“Southmrust Corporotion v. PLUS
System, CV-93-P-2291-S (U.S.
District Court for the Northern
District of Alahamu 1994).
Act. The tying violation alleged that
regional ATM network access and ATM
processing were separate products and
that MAC’s rules and practices effectively
forced its customers to purchase ATM
processing from EPS. The monopolization
claim alleged that EPS “willfully has
maintained its monopoly powerin the
market for regional ATM network
access in the affected states through
exclusionary practices.”
The consent decree required EPS to
open its network to independent ATM
processors on a nondiscriminatory
basis. EPS was permitted to provide
volume discounts for processing, but
these must he provided on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis. FPS was also required to
sell its network services “at prices that
will not varywith the processor selected”
and to provide a more open environment
for third-party processors.
The ATM driving rule was only one
of a series of EPS rules that seemed to
be clear restraints on competition both
by third-party processors and other
networks, including the national networks.
The parallel of the challenged rule to the
Supreme Court~s decision in Eastman
Kodak v Image Technical Services, Inc. is
obvious.” There Kodak tied equipment
servicing to its sales ol new equipment but
provided an exception for those who did
self-servicing internally The Supreme
Court sustained the plaintiffs’ tie-in claim
against the defendants’ summaryjudgment
motion. Thus what we see in EPS/Nationai
City is DOJ singling out one particular
restraint and securing its elimination by
consent decree in the context of
substantial monopoly power in the
branded ATM network access market that
the government alleged. -
One can anticipate more of this type of
litigation from the DOJ, private parties and
probably the state attorneys general. Any
dominant network rule that discriminates
against a particular class of market partici-
pants (for example, third-party data
processors) is an obvious target, as are
pricediscriminations and restraints by a
monopoly network on participants using
competitive networks. All of these would
seem to be classic actions of the types
punishable under sections 1 and 2 of the




The potential for conflict between
(1) a dominant network; and (2) network
participants, network competitors,
network users or government enforcers
falls into a variety of categories.
They include the following:
1. interchange fees and routing rules;
2. direct customer charge on network
transactions, acquirer surcharges
and issuer foreign fees;
3. routing rules;
4. switch fees in for-profit networks;
5. trademark usage rules and fees;
6. processing rules (including those
related to third-party processors);
7. use of nonbank cards and ATMs on
a network; and
8. scope of network services.
Let us look at each of these in turn.
Interchange fees. ATM networks, like
other payment systems, have traditionally
provided an interchange fee set by the
network to encourage activities that the
network believes need subsidizing. In an
ATM network, the interchange fee is paid
by the card issuer to the ATM owner. Oth-
erwise the ATM owner has no incentive to
allow a foreign card in its machine, and the
card issuer has no guaranteed outlet for its
cards. Stated more generally the ATM net-
work interchange fee is designed to
encourage acquirers to commit their ATMs
to the network. ATM network interchange
fees have been challenged at [eastonce by
a private antitrust plaintiff in the 1988
First Texas-PULSE arbitration as horizontal
price fixing or a card issuers’ cartel. The
arbitrator, however, held that the fee was
not illegal as long as the individual ATM
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owner was free to levy surcharges or
offer rebates.”
Regulating direct customer charges for
network transactions—ATM surcharges
and issuer fees. Any ATM network has a
legitimate (hut not necessarily unlimited)
interest when participants levy any trans-
action fees that maysubstantially reduce
network volume. These fees fall into two
categories: surcharges charged by ATM
owners andforeignfees charged by card
issuers. A network prohibition on individual
pricing byparticipants is certainlysubject to
a price fixing claim and must be defended
by the network on the Broadcast Music
ground that uniform pricing is necessary
to make thejoint network service work.
Interestingly, many ATM networks have
sought to restrict surcharges, but apparently
no network has yet dealt with the parallel
subject of issuer fees. The two seem to fall
logically in tandem. Higher issuer fees
may cause issuance of additional cards,
whereas surcharges may encourage deploy-
ment of additional ATMs. They may or
may not generateadditional networkvolume
(or may reduce it) depending on the level
of the fees and consumers’ response to
them. To prevail in a challenge to a
surcharge or issuer fee prohibition and to
pass muster under Broadcast Music, the
network will have to make a reasonable
showing chat the prohibited (or regulated)
fee is likely to reduce network volume
substantially or reduce the value of the
network trademark substantially
Litigation to date has been indecisive.”
We anticipate, however, that more is
to follow”
Routing rules. ATM networks have also
developed compulsory routing rules that
tell acquirers (and sometimes the issuer,
too) how to route every transaction.
These two subjects are closely related
because if both the ATM and the card are
eligible to participate in two separate net-
works, then the acquirer has every incentive
to send the transaction hack home by
whichever network has the higher
interchange fees. This is not necessarily a
form of competition that antitrust law
should seek to encourage because the
ultimate effect may be higher charges to
consumers. By contrast, an issuer routing
rule gives the card issuer, which pays the
switch and interchange fees, freedom to
designate the routingin such circumstances,
presumably based on both fees
and efficiency
In any event, serious antitrust concerns
are raised if a monopoly network—or even
a very strong one—insists that all transac-
tions be routed by it wherever possible.
This makes the creation of a new network
competitor very difficult indeed and should
probably be illegal on a tie-in or boycott
theory.” The lower courts have also gener-
ally applied the rule of reason in cases
involving boycott challenges to compulsory
routingrules. The most illuminating is a
D.C. Circuit decision by judges Robert
Bork and Ruth Bader Ginsberg, who
applied a rule of reason analysis to routing
rules in the household moving industry
In this case the defendant had a clear free
riding problem and lacked market power.”
Although ATM routing rules have gen-
erated considerable controversy only one
private case, BayBanks, Inc. v. New England
Network, Inc., has challenged a network
routing rule on antitrust grounds.” In that
case, BayBanks, the operator of the XPress
24 network in Massachusetts, sued the
Yankee 24 network and several New Eng-
land banks that were instrumental in
organizing the network. Bay Banks
challenged a compulsory routing rule that
required the major organizing banks to
run all the transactions between them
through the network switch, rather than a
subswitch. In March 1988, the parties
settled the case, thus leaving these
interesting antitrust issues unresolved.
Switch fees. Obviously a network switch
has to he supported, and therefore a reason-
able switch fee is easily within the Broadcast
Music standard. In the context of a nonprofit
jointventure, any switch fee presents little
problem for antitrust. The situation is
quite different where there is a proprietary
network with market power that is owned
“See Baker and Brondel 11988)
§23.07 [3] [6] (Bypass and
Routing).
“Rothery Storage & Von Co. v.
Atlas Von Lines, 792 F.2d 710
[U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
(D.C. Cir. 1986) petition for
certiorari denied 479 U.S.
1033 (1987). this case
involved a rule of Atlas Von
lines that required that any
Atlas order received by one of
its carrier agents be transported
under the operating authority of
Atlas. The rule was generated
by deregulation of the moving
industry in 1979 that mode it
easier for the local cacrer
agents to obtain their own
interstate authority and com-
pete against the national von
lines (such os Atlas). Thus
carrier agents could freeside on
Atlas’ efforts while cutting
prices to attract business that
otherwise would have gone to
the von line. In response to
this threat, Afas imposed o rule
that required its carrier agents,
if they chose to take their own
orders, to do so only through a
separately owned enterprise
using its own operating outhodty;
the new entity could not use
the facilities or services of
Atlas, nor could it use the Atlas
name. Applying the rule of rea-
son, the D.C. Circuit concluded
that the restraint was lawful—
both because the defendant
lacked market power and
becouse the rule was justified
as a legitimate attempt by
Atlas to eliminate free-riding.
792 F.2dat229.
“No. 86-3532-K ID. Moss. filed
Dec. 9, 1986). As discussed
below, the complaint also chal’
lenged the trademark license
fee that Yankee 24 proposed
to lew~ on transactions that
could have been routed to the
Yankee 24 switch.
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See Oelowore & Hudson Ry,
Co. sc ConsolidotedRoil Corp.,
9D2 E2d 174, 179-80 (2d
Cit. 1 99D), cert. denied 50D
U.S. 928 11991) (high mte
treoted as on access issue).
“See Baker and Rmndel (1995)
¶24.D7[4](c).
“This practice was abandoned
apparently as part of the
BoyBonks settlement.
“See Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Peoples’ Gas Light & Coke Co.,
364 U.S. 656 (1961).
“See Associated Press tc United
States, 326 U.S. 1(1945)
and its progeny. I have a lotof
difficulty with the sweep of the




RoilroodAssn., 224 U.S. 383
(1912).
by a few major banking institutions (or
even a single one) but necessarily used by
everyone. In this context, the switch may
look like a monopoly toll bridge, and the
switch fee maybe characterized as oppor-
tunistic gouging, or at least an important
revenue source for the shareholder-owners.
In these circumstances, a very high switch
fee could be credibly attacked by nonowner
users or DOJ under a horizontal price
fixing, monopolistic price squeeze or essen-
tial facility theory under the Sherman Act.”
Similarly a fee that discriminated strongly
against some group (for example, small
banks or out-of-state issuers) could also be
subject to a monopolistic abuse theory
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. As
more regional ATM networks become
monopolies, their switch fees are likely to
create a more pressing antitrust issue.
Trademark usage rules and fees. An ATM
network has to create a consumer product
and establish the organizationand infrastruc-
ture necessary to make it work. It is logical
therefore for the network to view its prin-
cipal asset—namely, its service mark—as
a device for supporting the promotional
costs of the network.” Several service
mark licensing approaches have been
tried, including a royalty on (1) every
card accessing the network, (2) every
ATM accessing the network and (3) every
network transaction, regardless of whether
it uses the network switch.
The per-transaction royalty fee has had
an uneven history When Connecticut
Switch expanded in 1986 to become the
New England Network and adopted a ser-
vice-mark licensing fee of several cents per
transaction, BayBanks promptly sued, chal-
lenging this fee as price-fixing and
monopolization.” By contrast, in the BPS
consent decree, DOJ allowed the defendant
to reserve the right to charge a per-transac-
tion trademark fee that was as high as its
switch fee—a right that would obviously
deter routing of transactions to other
switches and thereby deter entry of a
new network.
Even if a high per-transaction fee
constitutes an unreasonable restraint when
imposed by a monopoly network bent on
deterring new entry a competitive network
with a valuable trademark should be able
to charge license fees on any of a variety of
bases. Competition from another network
should ensure that such fees would not
he exorbitant.
Processing rules. A network needs to
have detailed specificationsand rules to
operate. As long as these are objective
or technically defensible, there should be
no antitrust problems. However, the pro-
cessing rules can raise the kinds of issues
that arise in standards-making cases under
the antitrust laws. From time to time,
certain products have been arbitrarily
excluded from certification or the certifica-
tion process has been skewed to favor
certain enterprises over others.”
Moreover, a processing rule that
requires all ATM transactions to be driven
by the network switch is plainly bad if
imposed by a monopoly (or even a very
powerful) branded ATM network. This is
exactlywhat DOj ordered eliminated in
the El’S/National City consent decree on
tie-in and monopolization theories.
Nonbank ATMs. Increasingly supermar-
kets and third-partyprocessors are deploying
ATMs, and a variety of merchants are
deploying POS arrangements with cash
back features that function similarly to
ATMs. Attempts by traditional banking
organizations controlling a joint venture
network to exclude nonbank ATM deployers
from the network will raise serious boycott
questions, if the network has a significant
degree of market power in its market.” In
a monopoly network situation the compul-
sory access principles of St. Louis Terminal
Railroad and its progeny may come into
play as we shall seeshortly”
Scope of network services. In the network
joint venture context, intense disputes can
exist over expansion of ajoint venture’s
network services. Often, the joint venture
offers small institutions certain things that
large institutions can offer alone. This
type of dispute is most likely to occur
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openly in a nonprofitjoint venture in
which different sizes and types of
institutions have board representation.
It has occasionally turned into an antitrust
dispute. (My favorite example was
Citibank’s mid-1970s case against the
MasterCharge joint venture to enjoin it
from issuing traveler’s checks, a market in
which Citibank—a leading MasterCharge
issuer—was a major player. The case
never went to trial.)
Antitrust conflicts of the typesjust
outlined are inevitable in an environment
where diverse competitive interests must
depend on a facility for which there
are no clear alternatives—especially
when it is controlled by a small group of
competitors. The dominant network is
necessarily subject to stricter antitrust rules
when aggrieved competitors have fewernet-
work alternatives. By allowing dominant
regional ATM networks, the DOJ and the
Federal Reserve have simply created a
larger field of antitrust risks for more
networks. More business disputes have
been taken out of the market and will
be switched—potentially—--- to the
courthouse, where treble damages and
attorneys’ fees under the Clayton Act
will encourage private plaintiffs to frame
their claims in antitrust terms w-henever
possible. We have seen this in a good
many private antitrust cases challenging
ATM network practices during the past
decade—including cases brought by
largeand aggressive banks against
networks. In such an environment,
antitrust planning is a prudent exercise
for any important ATM network and
its major participants. Most major
ATM networks are largely controlled by
their leading institutions, which issue
the bulk of the network cards and
deploy the bulk of ATMs. In some
instances (for example, EPS), the network
is a profitable enterprise owned by a few of
its largest members, which, as shareholders,
elect all the directors and collect all the
profits. In others (for example, Pulse), the
network is a nonprofit entity with election
of directors on a town meeting basis,




Mysuggestions for antitrust planning
by a dominant network fall into three
general areas:
• More representative corporate
governance arrangements;
• Greater flexibility in use ofthe
network facilities or competitive
alternatives by participants; and
‘Use of alternative dispute resolu-
tion procedures for handling
antitrust disputes among
network participants.
None of these steps depends on the others,
but theywork well as a package.
Corporate Governance. Whenever a
network board of directors (or the
management that it has elected) is obliged
to make a decision that affects different
network participants in different ways, the
decision becomes easier to defend ifall
affected interests were represented in the
decision making process. Thus, in principle,
it is advisable to have small institutions
represented on the board or even to have
public directors elected from outside the
ownership or network participants.”
Operational Flexibility. A dominant net-
work should be careful that its technical
standards are technicallyjustifiable—and
not more restrictive of competition among
users than technically necessary The net-
work needs to he especially careful that
technical justifications are notjust a guise
for what is really a monopoly rent
enhancement scheme.” Giving members
operational flexibility to route transactions
over alternative networks is likely to he a
particularly important operational issue in
the case of regional monopoly ATM
“See Baker and Brandel (1995)
124.08. Interestingly, when
the New York Stack lxchnnge
(a very dominant network)
come under heavy antitrust and
political fire for its rate fixing on
broker cnmmissions in the late
1 96Ds, the exchange begnn
appointing distinguished public
directors, who did not represent
NYSlfirms,
See United States v. Electronic
Payments Services Inc 11994)
and generally Baker and
Brondel 11995)1124.07
[21 and (31.
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“Mitsubishi Motors Corp. c Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, mc, 473
U.S. 614 (1985).
“See, Baker and Stabile
(1993).
There is one fomous example
of an antitrust arbitration of
major ATM network dispute.
The First Texos/Finonriol
Interchange, Inc. Arbitrotiog
55 ATRR 420 (1988). I
worked on it for the respondent
network.




“224 U.S. at 409.
“See Baker and Brandel
(1995), ~j 22.0314) [ci, dis-
cussing U.S. Rocky Mountoin
Automated flooring House
Assn., CA. No. 77~39l(U.S.
District Courtfor Colorado
1977); and U.S.c California
Automated Clearing House
Assn., CA. No. 771 463-ITt
(U.S. District Court for the North
District of Colifornini 977).
networks. This is an issue of not only
computer programs and switches,but also
fee structures for gateways and trademark
usage on bypass transactions.
Alternative Dispute Resolution. In 1985,
the Supreme Court opened the door to
arbitration of antitrust cases between those
in a contractual relationship.” As a result,
an ATM network—even a monopoly—can
institute a reasonable arbitration program
as part of its membership and participation
arrangements; it can even appoint a partic-
ular arbitrator or panel to hear cases. As
long as the arbitrator or panel is neutral,
industry expertise can be injected into the
process—and some greater certainty can
be generated in the context of proceedings
that have a limited time for decision. The
process islikely to be successful in reducing
the cost and uncertainty of disputes only if
a lot of care goes into designing the process
and selecting arbitration panels.”
Of course, arbitration onlyprovides
assistance where the antitrust dispute is
among a network and its participants.”
By contrast, ifthe charge is discrimination
against an outsider (for example, a
nonmember financial institution, another
network or a third-party processor) then
the antitrust case will go to the federal
courthouse. The same is true ifthe
practice is being challenged by DOJ or a
state attorney general.
To conclude, any dominant ATM
network faces a real antitrust exposure; it
should do everything possible to avoid
being arbitrary in its decisions or the way
it goes about making them.
CONCLUSWN: THE PAST
AS PROLOGUE?
It is fitting—and indeed almost
Biblical—that we should come to St. Louis
for today’s discussion. For it is out of your
history here that the next chapter of the
ATM network antitrust history may yet
be written.”
When the railroads came west, they
came to St. Louis, and this crucial crossing
point on the Great River became a vital
bridgehead and terminal. Some 24 railroads
connected here. Through a series of
acquisitions, a smaller group of presum-
ably richer railroads extinguished the
competing ferry service and acquired all
the rail links to the two big bridges across
the Mississippi. Their joint venture com-
pany (owned by 14 railroads) monopolized
the East St. Louis traffic that had no alterna-
tives, while being competitive for traffic
that could use the bridges upriver at Alton,
Illinois or downriver at Memphis. The
Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis
(Terminal Company) discriminated against
nonowner railroads. Into this thicket
charged President William Howard Taft’s
Department ofjustice and urged that the
monopoly Terminal Company be broken
up into competitive pieces. It was a
simpler age, and the DOj probably
proceeded without economic counsel,
let alone expert witnesses armed with
intriguing regression analyses.
The two districtjudges who heard the
evidence here in St. Louis could not decide
what to do and issued no opinion or
findings. The government appealed.
The U.S. Supreme Court thus became
the court of first (as well as last) resort in
the case. In its celebrated Terminal
Railroad Assn. decision of 1912, the court
decided that breaking up the monopoly (as
DOJ had urged) would he inefficient given
the local terrain. Instead, the court decided
that the Terminal Company should he
restructured so that all market participants
could become owners—or, if they preferred,
could be offered access to the terminal, as
the Court said, “on as nearly an equal
plane as may he with respect to expenses
and charges” as the owners.”
The Terminal Railroad Assn. principle
has been applied to a variety of regional
monopoly facilities—including a fish
market, several tobacco markets, sports
stadiums, and even a couple of
Fed-supported regional automated
clearinghouse facilities.” It remains a
vital principle in today’s world of ever
more sophisticated nec\vorks. Yet it is
a second best principle: competition
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among networks is generally preferable Baxter, William F, Poul H. Cootner and Kenneth F. Scott. Retoil Banking
to having a federal court sit as a public in the Electronic Age: The low ond Economics of Electronic Funds
utility commission to restructure and Tronsfer(1977).
supervise the terms of access to CB&T Bancshores, Inc., Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 70(19841,
a network.” p. 589.
Terminal Railroad is still the best .-
-. . Centerre Bancorpnraton, Federal Reserve Bulletrn, vol. 69(1983),
prtnciple that we have to deal wxth the sut- 643
uation where natural monopoly economics
or government decisions based on natural Citicorp, Federol Reserve Bulletin, vol. 72(1986), p. 583.
monopoly assumptions have created a Competitive Impact Statement in United Stotes v. Electronic Payments
joint venture monopoly for which there is Servkes Inc., 59 Federal Register (Fed. Reg.) 24711 (May 12,
no likely substitute. Because the Board of 1994).
Governors now’ seems to assume that .. -
-, - . - Interstate Frnoncral Corp., Federol Reserve Bulletin, vol. 69(1983),
regional monopoly isa way of life in AIM 560
networks, we can expect to hear a lot more -
about Terminal Railroad—as those who Sovcon Financiol Corp., Federol Resenie Bulletin, vol. 72(1986),
have been excluded from ownership in the p. 347.
monopolies seek o\vnership rights or a The Bank of New York Company, Inc., Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 3D
position “on as nearly an equal plane” (19941,pp.1107-11.
with those whom the Fed and the DOj
have authorized to own these vital
electronic bridgeheads.
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